There is an apparent ambiguity in Thomas Hobbes’s account in Leviathan1 of the source of the sovereign’s right to punish. Hobbes appears to both claim and deny that the prospective sovereign is granted the right to punish by prospective subjects. In claiming that the sovereign is granted the right to punish, we understand Hobbes to hold that the acquisition of the right follows from authorization—a process by which a representative is commissioned to act on the behalf of another person. In (...) denying that the sovereign is granted the right to punish, we understand Hobbes to hold that the possession of the right is merely the product of the mass relinquishment of natural rights; the prospective sovereign alone does .. (shrink)

This paper has a threefold purpose: first, to criticize the customary application of Hohfeld’s theory of rights to Hobbes’s juridical/political theory that reduces all Hobbesian rights to Hohfeldian privileges; second, to defend the appropriateness of a proper application of a Hohfeldian analysis of rights to Hobbes’s theory by responding to criticisms offered by Eleanor Curran; and, lastly, to reveal the value a Hohfeldian analysis offers in clarifying a Hobbesian right that has been generally misunderstood in the literature. I argue that (...) a Hohfeldian analysis helps make sense of the complex juridical relationships between the sovereign, the perpetrator of crime, and the victim of crime involved in Hobbes’s treatment of the sovereign’s right to punish. (shrink)